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ADMIRALTY-JURISDICTION-BEACON.-UNITED STATES V. EVANS, 25 Sup.
CT. 46.-Held, that admiralty jurisdiction extends to a libel in rem against a
vessel for negligently injuring a beacon standing fifteen or twenty feet from
the channel of a bay, in water twelve or fifteen feet deep, though it is built
upon piles driven firmly into the bottom.
Formerly admiralty jurisdiction was limited to the high seas. New Jersey
Steam Nav. Co. vz,. Merchant's Bank, 6 How. 344. Later it was held to ex-
tend to all public navigable water. The Genesee Chief v. Fztzhugh, 53 U.
S. 443. But not to an injury done by a vessel to an object on land. The
Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20. Courts of admiralty have also declined to assume
jurisdiction where a fire is set to a house by a passing boat. Fxfiarte Phoenix
Ins. Co., 118 U. S. 61o; where the injury is to a bridge, swinging on a pier,
constructed on the bed of a river, Curtis v. City of Milwaukee, 37 Fed. 705;
John C. Sweeney, s5 Fed. 54o; where the injury is to a boom, though it ex-
tends into navigable water, Brig "City ofErie" v. Canfield, 27 Mich. 479;
also where a vessel collides with and injures a derrick, attached to the bottom.
The Maud Webster, Fed. Cas. No. 9,302. The present case is apparently in
conflict with former decisions, and is illustrative of the tendency to enlarge
admiralty jurisdiction.
ADVERSE PossEssIoN-AGAINST WHOM.-MAAS v. BURDEZKE, Iox N. W.
182 (MINN.).-Held, that one may acquire title to land by adverse possession as
against the true owner, though he erroneously believed it to be public land
and intended to hold and claim it under the federal homestead law.
In some states to gain title by adverse possession it must be against the
whole world; Beate v. Hite, 35 Ore. 176; thus it was held in Flewellen v.
.Randall, 7 4 S. W. 49, that where a man enters upon land supposing it to be-
long to the state and with the intention of acquiring it from the state he does
not gain title by adverse possession against the true owner. But on the other
hand, and, it seems, by weight of authority, it is held that the plaintiff must
recover, if at all, on the strength of his own title, Mather v. Walsh, 107 MO.
X21; and that possession need not be adverse to the whole world but only to
the one who is asserting title in himself. Skifiwith r. Martin, So Ark. 141 ;
and though one admit title in the state, he may gain title by holding con-
tinuously and adversely to the real owner for the statutory period. Franceur
v. Newhouse, 14 Sawy. 6oi.
BANKRUPTCY-MANUFACTURING CORPORATIoN-LAUNDRY.-IN RE TROY
STEAM LAUNDERING CO., 13 AM. B.RP 9 7.-Held, that a corporation organized
for general laundry business, but whose principal business is the laundering
of collars and cuffs, etc., for manufacturers of those articles, prior to their
being put on the market, is engaged in manufacturing and subject to be
adjudged a bankrupt.
To be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt, the corporation must be one
clearly within the provisions of the act. Wilson v. City Bank, 17 Wall. 473.
The process of manufacture is supposed to produce some new article, and
does not consist in a mere change of form of the original article. Hartranft
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v. Wiegman, 121 U. S. 609; Peofile v. Roberts, 145 N. Y. 377. A manu-
facturing corporation may be one that merely performs work and labor, the
materials being furnished by other parties. In re Niagara Contracting Co.,
127 Fed. 782. It is clear that a laundry company, doing only domestic-work,
is not a manufacturer. In re White Star Laundry Co., 117 Fed. 570.
BANKS-LIABILITY TO THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF A DECEASED
DEPOSITOR.-KELLEY v. BUFFALO SAy. BANK, 72 N. E. g5 (N. Y.).-Where,
after the death of a depositor in a saving's bank, of which fact the bank was
ignorant, his bank book was produced, and a draft presented, purportfag to
bear his signature, which was paid by the bank, held, that failure to make a
physical comparison of such signature to the draft with the signature of the
depositor on file in the bank, renders the bank liable for such payment, for
failure to exercise due care and ordinary caution.
The officers of a savings bank are to be held to the exercise of reasonable
care and diligence. Eaves v. Peofles' S. Bank, 27 Conn. 229; Boone v.
Citizens' S. Bank, 84 N. Y. 83. The exercise of mere diligence will not
protect the bank where it knows of the depositor's death. Farmer V. fan-
hattan S. Inst., 6o Hun 462; Fowler v. B. S. Bank, 113 N. Y. 450. A rule
or clause in the deposit book is part of the contract between the bank and its
depositor. White v. Bank, 22 Pick. 183; Wallace /. Bank, 7 Gray 134;
Eaves v. Peofiles' S. Bank, sufira. The common rule, authorizing payment
on the death of a depositor to his legal representatives, is designed to protect
the depositor when he no longer can protect himself, and requires the bank to
employ special care to see that payment is made to the proper person. 1armer
v. Af. S. Inst., Supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CONSTRUCTION OF VIADUCT-LIABILITY OF MUNICI-
PALITY TO ABUTTING OWNER.-SAUER V. CITY OF Nnw YORK, 72 N. E. 579
(N. Y.).-When a statute authorizes the construction of a viaduct above the
surface of a street and such construction diminishes the value of an abutting
owner's property, occasioning dust and noise, impairing ingress and egress,
and interrupting light and air, held, that the statute is not unconstitutional,
the damages sustained being damnum absque injuria. Vann and Bartlett,
J J., dissenting.
This decision is distinguishable from Story v. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122, where
damages were allowed, on the ground that the obstructions were incompatible
with, and destructive of, the use of the street as such. Under a con-
stitutional provision prohibiting the taking of private property for public use
without compensation, it is held that abutting property owners who sustain
special damages from the construction of street improvements are entitled to
compensation. -Pause v. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92; Barrows v. Sycamore, iSo Ill.
588. In Rening v. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 157, it was said that the owner is en-
titled to the benefit of the street for egress and other purposes and cannot be
deprived thereof without compensation. Indirect injuries, however, suffered
in common with the general public, are not recoverable. Rigney v. Chicago, 102
Ill. 64. A diversion of public traffic from the street in front of the property is not
ground for compensation, Hobson v. Philadelfihia, X55 Pa. 131; and the con-
struction of an elevated approach to a viaduct occupying the entire width of the
street is damnum absque injuria. Coldough v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 182.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INsPEcTIoN LAWS.-TERRITORY EX REL. E. J.
MCLEAN & Co. v. DENVER & R. G. R. Co., 79 PAC. 74 (NEw MEXICO.).--
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Held, that an inspection law for the sole purpose of aiding in the detection
and punishment of crime or fraud against an industry is valid. Baker, J.,
dissenting-.
A state may make rules for the conduct of the most necessary and com-
mon occupations when from their nature they afford peculiar opportunities
for imposition and fraud. Cooley, Cons. Lim., 7th Ed., 886; Hawthorn v.
Peofile, sOg Ill. 308. Also when the business affords peculiar opportunities
for the commission of crime. Comm. v. Ducey, 126 Mass. 269. But a state
cannot make a law designed to detect or prevent crime an inspection law,
within the constitutional meaning of that word, by calling it so in the title.
Peofile v. Comfiagnie Gindrale, 107 U. S. 59; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113
U. S. 703, 71o. Such inspection law to be valid must not substantially hamper
or burden either foreign or interstate commerce. Railroad v. .Husen, 95 U.
S. 465. Yet although such state regulations may affect interstate commerce
in some measure, if the regulations are local in their nature and adapted to
the locality they will not be considered void unless they run counter to
legislation that Congress has enacted. Cooley, Prin. of Cons. Law, 7.
CRImINAr. LAw-EVIDENCE-REFRESHING MEMORY.-STATE v. ASPARA, 37
So. 883 (LA.).-Held, that a witness in a criminal trial may refresh his
memory by referring to testimony previously given by him on the preliminary
hearing of the accused.
In most jurisdictions a witness cannot have recourse to his previous
testimony before the grand jury. Putnam v. U. S., 162 U. S. 687; Comm. v.
Phelfs, 77 Mass. 73; contra, State v. Miller, 53 Iowa x54. But when a
witness for the prosecution manifests a disposition to favor the defendant, the
prosecution may call his attention to such previous testimony. Hurley v.
State, 46 0. St. 320. It is generally held that the attention of a witness may
be called to the testimony given by him in a previous trial of the same case.
Peofile v. Palmer, 1o5 Mich. 568. But the testimony of a witness on the trial
of another defendant in the same indictment cannot be read to him for any pur-
pose. Brown v. State, 28 Ga. 19q. The ruling in the present case regarding
testimony given at a prior preliminary examination seems to follow the weight
of authority. Harvey v. State, 40 Ind. 516; White v. State, i8 Tex. App. 57.
DEAD BODIES-ACTION FOR MUTILATION-DAMAGES.-KOERBER V. PATEK, 102
N. W. 4o (Wis.).-Held, thatthe senseof outrage and mental sufferingresulting
directly from the wilful mutilation by defendant of the body of plaintiff's
deceased mother are proper independent elements of compensatory damages.
Damages will be allowed for mental suffering, without physical injury,
where the suffering was caused by a wanton act. Gillesfiie v. Brooklyn H.
R. R., 178 N. Y. 347. For an authorized autopsy damages will not lie where
it was shown to be conducted in the ordinary way. Winkler v. Hawkes et
al., 102 N. W. 4T8 (Iowa); Cook vu. Walley, r Colo. App. x63. As to authorized
autopsies see the leading case of Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307; also a dis-
cussion in the N. Y. Law journal, Vol. 32, p. I954; Hockenhammer v. L. &'
E Ry. Co., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2383.
DEATH BY WRONGFUL AT-PASSENGER ON CONSTRUCTION TRAIN-LIA-
BILITY OF COMPANY.-PENNSYLVANIA Co. V. COYER, 72 N. W. 875 (ILL.).-
Decedent, an employee of a construction company, received notice from the
railroad company of a rule forbidding the employees of the construction com-
pany to ride on a work train. Held, that habitual violation of such rule by
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such employees, and a failure to enforce it by the conductor or other persons
having charge of the trains will not render the company liable for the death
of the decedent, in the absence of proof that the company had knowledge of
such disregard, and acquiesced therein.
A passenger is "one who travels in some public conveyance, by virtue of
a contract, express or implied, with the carrier, as to the payment of fare or
that which is accepted as an equivalent therefor." Bucker v. R. Co., 132 Pa.
z; Penn. R. Co. v.. Price, o6 Pa. 256. It is presumed that persons riding on
trains which clearly are not designed for the transportation of passengers are
not lawfully there. Waterbury v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 21 Blatchf. 314. The
burden of proof is on one riding on such a train to show that the carrier has
departed from this rule. Robertson v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 22 Barb. gi. Con-
ductors and other employees in charge of a train have no authority to relax
such rule, either to invite or permit persons to take passage thereon. Eaton
v. Del., etc., R. Co., 57 N. Y. 382; Houston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex.
3 1; Waterbury v.N. Y., etc., R. Co., sufira. Butonehavingpaidhisfare and
entered the "saloon" car of a freight train, contrary to the company's regula-
tions, was allowed to collect for injuries, on the ground that the company
knew of such violation. Dunn v. G. T. R. Co., 58 Me. 187.
EASEMENTS-LOT BOUNDED ON STREET MARKED ON PLAT.-EDWARDS V.
MOUNDSVILLE LAND Co., 48 S. E. 754 (W. VA.).-Held that purchasers of
lots have a right to have all the streets marked on the plat by which they pur-
chased kept open as streets, and their rights are not confined to the part of the
street in front of the lots purchased by them.
The extent of the rights acquired by purchasers of lots with reference to a
plat does not seem to be definitely settled. This court follows the best decis-
ions, and adopts the "unity plan," whereby purchasers acquire an easement
in the streets as marked in the whole plat, and not merely in an adjacent
street. Moale v. Mayor, 5 Md. 314; Derby v. Alling, 40 Conn. 410; Winona
vi. Huff, ii Minn. zi9. A private purchaser acquires this right at the time of
purchase, although the public has as yet no right to use and control, by either
acceptanceoruser. Wolf'e v. Sullivan, 133 Ind. 331; In re Pearl Street,
IIi Pa. 565. But many courts hold, in the absence of either acceptance or
user by the public, that the purchaser is entitled only to have an adjacent
street kept open for its full width to the nearest traveled highway, and that he
has no right in other streets designated on the plat. Randall v Hall, 4 DeG.
& Sm. 343; Mahler v. Brumder, 92 Wis. 477.
EQUITY-NOTICE-SALE BY BONA FIDE PURCHASER.-LIvINGSTONE V.
MURPHY, 72 N. E. 1012 (MASS.).-Held, that one purchasing from a bona
fide purchaser thougli himself having notice takes the title of his grantor.
A person who has bought in good faith, without notice of an equity, and
thereby holds a good title can convey an equally good title to any purchaser
whether that purchaser has notice of the equity or not. The D. M. French,
Fed. Cas. No. 3,938; Barber v. Richardson, 57 Vt. 408. The reason for the
above rule is to prevent a stagnation of property and because the purchaser
being entitled to hold and enjoy must be equally entitled to sell. Bumfius v.
Plattner, x Johns. Ch. 213; Trueluch vi. Peoples, 3 Kelly 446. But the rule
does not apply where the purchaser without notice or his successor sells to one
through whose hands the property has once passed and who at that time could
not shield himself behind a bona fide purchaser by himself or one through
whom he took. Church v. Ruland, 64 Pa. 444; BisA., Eguity, sec. 265.
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EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION-PROBATIVE FORCE.-VINCENT V. MUTUAL FUND
LiFE Asso., 77 CONN. 281.-Held, overruling Sturdevant's Ateal, 71 Conn.
392, that when the law presumes statements made by one deceased in an
application for insurance to be true, such presumption is not entitled to be
weighed and considered as evidence by the jury.
It has been held that a presumption of innocence does not cease upon sub-
mission of a cause to the jury, Peofle v.. O'Brien, io6 Cal. 104; but operates
during the deliberation of the jury until they have arrived at a verdict. Coff1n
vz. U. S., 156 U. S. 432; People v. Mclfanus, 94 Cal. 5og. These cases are
based upon a misunderstanding of the loosely used phrase, that "presumption
of innocence is to be regarded by the jury in every case,as a matter of evidence,"
and which merely means that the burden of proof is on the other party, Green-
leaf on Er'., (16th ed.) Sec. 34; and it is not error to refuse to direct a jury
that they ought to regard a presumption of innocence as evidence, Woolen v.
State, 24 Fla. 335; the true rule being that a legal presumption should not be
considered by the jury as a matter of evidence entitled to be weighed by them
in arriving at a verdict. State v. Linoff, 121 Iowa 632; State v. Kennedy, 55
S. W. 273.
HOMEsTEAD-ADDITION.-WILKS V. VAUGHAN, 83 S. W. 913 (ARK.).-
Held, that when a homestead right has once been acquired in land less than
the maximum area allowed by a statute it may be increased to that maximum
area by purchasing adjoining land, though the homesteader is not at the time
residing on the homestead. McCulloch, J., dissenting.
This is a case of first impression but it has been held that a debtor might
purchase adjoining land, bringing his homestead up to the maximum area, and
have the homestead rights attach to it, Camfibell v. McManus, 32 Tex. 442;
and when he once acquires a homestead by actual occupation and then moves
away, but with the intention of returning and making it his home, it is pro-
tected from foreclosure sale. Hand v'. Winn, 52 Miss. 784. Not only is con-
tinuity of occupancy not indispensable to preserve the homestead rights but it
must be shown clearly and decisively that the homesteader intended to
absolutely abandon it in order to destroy them. Campbell v. Adair, 45 Miss.
170. It is well established that the law recognizes no difference between
actual and constructive occupation so far as retaining homestead rights, Parr
v'. Newby, 73 Tex. 468; there seems to be no reason why it should so far as
adding to these rights.
INJUNCTION-PUBLIC OFFIcERs-TRxsPAss IN DI9CHARGE OF DUTY.-HALE
v. BURNS, 91 N. Y. SUPP. 929.-Police officers were stationed by the defendant,
a captain of police in New York City, in the plaintiff's saloon on suspicion that
gambling was being conducted therein. An injunction was sought and the
court held that the public officers could be restrained from performing acts in
the discharge of their duties which come within the nature of a trespass, to
the irreparable injury of the aggrieved party.
Equity will Interfere where trespasses are repeated or continuing, Chiles
'V, Ringo, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 302; Miller v.' Lynch, I49 Pa. 460; Wheelock v.
Noonan, xo8 N. Y. 179; or where damages can only be estimated by con-
jecture and not by accurate standards. Johnson v. Kier, 3 Pitts. R. 204. An
injunction will issue to prevent a public officer from unlawfully assuming
power over property in such manner as to infringe upon or violate the rights
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of a citizen. Noble v'. U. R. L. R. Co., z47 U. S. 165. Plaintiff must show
that some act in violation of his rights has been actually done, or irreparable
injury is threatened. Judd v. 7;7wn of Fox Lake, 28 Wis. 583. The court
in this case follow Weiss v. Herlihy, 23 App. Div. 6o8, in requiring that the
defendant show with some degree of certainty that illegal acts have been done
on the premises. Similar actions have been denied, City of Chicago 'v.
Wright, 69 Ill. 318; even where the supervision of the police was exercised
in an arbitrary and unlawful manner. Stennan v. Kennedy, 15 Abb. Prac. 201.
LICENSEs-REcovERY OF FEE-VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.-SOUTHERN Ry. Co.
v. CITY OF FLORENCE, 37 So. 844 (Ala.).-Held, that a threat to begin action
for collection of penalty for failure to pay license fee does not render payment
under protest an involuntary payment.
Mere threats do not ordinarily constitute such coercion as to render a tax
payment invohntary. Williams v. Stewart, 115 Ga. 864; DeBaker v.
Carillo, 52 Cal. 473. But if the demand is made under color of office and
threat of immediate and effectual enforcement, the rule is otherwise. St.
Anthony Elevator Co. v. Bottineu, 9 N. Dak. 346; First Nat. Bank v.
Watkins, 21 Mich. 483. And the payment is involuntary if made to prevent
discontinuance of business. .Swzft Co. v. U S., III U. S. 29; Scottish Union
Ins. Co. v. Herrtott, 1o9 Iowa 6o6. But all rights must be expressly reserved.
Yates v. Royal Ins. CO., 200 Ill. 202. When the payment is made to avoid a
penalty it is commonly held, contrary to the present case, that the payment is
involuntary. Magnolia v. Sherman, 46 Ark. 358; Allen v. Burlington, 46
Vt. 202.
LOTTERY-WHAT CONSTITUTES-SUIT CLUB.-DEFLORIN V. STATE, 49 S.
B. 699 (GA.).-Held, that a "suit club" whose members pay $i per week, and
which holds weekly drawings, as a result of which the member holding the
lucky number receives his suit and ceases to be a member of the club, is a
lottery.
Any method of dealing by which a pecuniary consideration is paid and It
is determined by lot or chance, according to some scheme held out to the
public, what and how much he who pays the money is to have for it, or
whether he is to have anything, is a lottery. MacDonald v. U. S., 63 Fed.
426; Hull v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424. Thus where lots are sold at a fixed
price, and the particular lots are ascertained by chance, it is a lottery. Wooden
V. Shotwell, 24 N. J. L. 789; Allebach v. Godshalh, i6 Pa. 329. When, as
in the principal case, each knows by the terms of his contract just what he is
to receive, but not how much he is going to have to pay therefor, the principle
is the same. It depends absolutely on the chance element being present.
Peefile v. Elliott, 74 Mich. 264; Ex P. Kameta, 36 Ore. 251.
MORTGAGES-DEED ABSOLUTE ON ITS FACE-EVIDENCE.-RECH v. DYER
ET. AL., 72 N. B. 922 (N. Y.).-Held, that a deed, absolute in form cannot
be held, as a matter of law, to be a mortgage when the grantee advanced part
of the price to the grantor under an agreement that the grantee might within
a year from the date of the deed retain the title to the premises by paying the
balance of the price-with the understanding that the money should be treated
as a loan if the grantee concluded not to purchase-and there was evidence
that the parties intended the instrument to be a deed and that the possession
of the premises was surrendered to the grantee. Martin, O'Brien and Vann,
JJ., dissenting.
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Whether a conveyance of land accompanied by an agreement by the
grantee to reconvey on condition is a mortgage or a sale depends on the in-
tention of the parties. Murray v. Riley, r40 Mass. 49o. But the grantor's
intention in making a deed is not material upon the question whether or not
it is a mortgage, if not communicated to the grantee. Phoenix V. Gardner,
13 Minn. 43o. A covenant to reconvey may be one among other facts showing
that the parties intended the deed to operate as a mortgage. Henley v.
Hotaling, 41 Cal. 22. In determining whether a deed absolute on its face is
a mortgage great weight is attached to these circumstances, that the alleged
price was greatly inadequate, that the vendor remained in possession of the
property and that there had been pending negotiations for a loan. Davis v.
Demming, 12 W. Va. 246.
PARTNERSHIP-SALE OF PROPERTY-ACCOUNTING.--CoMSTOCK V.McDONALD,
ioi N. W. 55 (Mic.).-Where the administrator and widow of a deceased
partner were induced to sell partnership realty by a secret agreement with the
intending purchaser to pay them an additional sum for their assent, held, that
the additional sum would be treated as a part of the partnership funds and an
accounting would be in favor of the surviving partners. Moore, C. J., dissent-
ing.
An administrator who deals with or undertakes to control partnership
assets is deemed to be an agent of the surviving partner and benificiaries
and can make- no profit for himself. Marlott v. Scantland, 19 Ark. 443;
Hewes v. Baxter, 48 La. 13o3. The trustee is regarded as trustee of the
surviving partner, Griffth v. Godey, IX3 U. S. 89; and cannot gain any
personal advantage touching the thing or subject as to which the fiduciary
position exists. Bisfiham, Equity, See. 92.
PtINCIPAL AND AGENT-DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY-SUBSTITUTION.-
CULLINAN, COMMISSIONER OF EXCISE, V. BOWKER ET AL., 72 N. E. 91i (N. Y.).
-Held, that where a surety company appointed an agent to sign, execute and
attach the seal of the company to bonds filed under theliquor tax law the agent
cannot delegate his powers to a clerk in his office. Vann, Bartlett and
Martin, JJ., dissenting.
If authority to do an act be delegated to one he must in general do that
act himself and cannot delegate his authority to another. Shankland v.
Washington, 30 U. S. 390; Stoughton v'. Baker, 4 Mass. 522. But such
authority to employ a sub-agent is implied where from the nature of the agency
a substitute is necessary. Dorchester Bank v. N. E. Bank, 55 Mass. 177. An
agent may delegate his powers which are merely mechanical. Common-
wealth Bank v. Norton, I Hill 5o. But where a personal trust and confi-
dence is confided in an agent, requiring the exercise of judgment and discre-
tion, his powers cannot be delegated to another without special power of
substitution. Daly vi. Stetson, 54 N. Y. Super. Ct. 202.
RECORDING-SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE.-MURRAY xT AL V.
ZILLER, 59 ATL. 261 (N. J.).-Held, that it is not sufficient compliance with
the statute requiring chattel mortgages to be immediately recorded, and
strangers are not charged with notice of the mortgage, when the clerk, after
making the indorsement of receipt in which the book and page of recording
are left blank, returns the mortgage to the mortgagee without recording it.
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Where there is a discrepancy between the date of actual record of a
mortgage, as it appears on the record book, and the constructive record shown
by the indorsement made upon the instrument when deposited, the former
must prevail, unless in the case of those having notice and knowledge of the
latter. Donald v. Beals, 57 Cal. 399. An entire copy of the mortgage need
not be recorded. Enough to give the public notice with reasonable certainty
of the particulars is sufficient. Poutz v. Reggio, 25 La. Ann. IS4. There are
a good many cases holding that, when the holder of an instrument leaves it
with the recorder for record, it is to be regarded as recorded from that
time, though not then actually recorded or recorded in the wrong book. Fara-
bee v. MfcKerrihan, 172 Pa. 234; Throckmorton vz. Price, 28 Tex. 605. The
presumption is that an instrument is recorded when received for record. Wing
v. Hall, 47 Vt 182.
TOETS-LIBEL-PRIVILEGED STATEMENTS.-HoLMES v. CLISBY, 48 S. E.
934 (GA.).-Held, that statements published in good faith by one to protect
his own interests in a matter where he is concerned, as well as to protect the
interests of another, whom he represents as agent, are privileged, when the
character of the publication is such as to make it reasonably necessary, under
the surrounding circumstances, to accomplish the desired purpose.
This is an exception to the general rule and it is based on the ground that
some apparently recognized obligation or motive may fairly be presumed to
have led to the publication. White v. Nicholls, 3 fow. 266; Locke v. Brad-
street Co., 22 Fed. 771. The publisher must have a legitimate interest in the
matter communicated. Simmonds v. Duane, Ir. Rep. 5 Com. Law 358.
Those to whom the communication is made must be parties having an im-
mediate interest in the matter. Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87; Sunderlin v.
Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. I88; contra, Brow v. Hathaway, 95 Mass. 239. The pub-
lisher is not liable, if such publication is made in the interest of other parties.
Lawler v,. Earle, 87 Mass. 22. To establish a qualified privilege, the defend-
ant must show that he believed the published statement to be true. State v.
Hashins, iog Iowa 656.
WILLs-PRoMIsE TO CoNvEY PRoPETY-TRusTEz EX MALEFICIO.-
CASSELS ET AL. V. FINN, 49 S. E. 749 (GA.).-Held, that the failure to per-
form an oral promise, made by the sole heir at law of one desiring to dispose of
her estate to third persons, that he will dispose of her estate as she desires,
cannot make the heir at law, in case of intestacy, a trustee ex malefcio as to
the property inherited by him, in the absence of actual fraud.
This case seems to point out a clear rule upon a point about which there
appears to be much confusion, by slightly modifying the rule that when the
making of a will is prevented by the promise of an heir or distributee to hold
the property in trust for a partictlar person, he will be held a constructive
trustee. Strickland v. Aldridge, 9 Ves. Jr. 516; Hoge v. Hoge, I Watts
213. Some courts have held that no fraud need be present. Ransdel v.
Mloore, 153 Ind. 393. Others have denied the doctrine altogether. Moore v.
Camj bell, 102 Ala. 445. Where the heir attempts to carry out the promise
with a defective conveyance, equity will in some jurisdictions remedy the
defects. Browne v. Browne, I Har. & I. 43o. The taker has also been held
as for money had and received. Williams '. Fitch, I8 N. Y. 546.
